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Constitutional Criminal Procedure 
by Thomas E. Baker* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article discusses decisions of the Eleventh Circuit and also some 
decisions of the former Fifth Circuit that have the effect of precedent for 
the Eleventh Circuit.1 Following the approach taken in the last survey,-
the scope of Constitutional Criminal Procedure will be narrowed. This 
Article will not. discuss nonconstitutional survey decisions on related 
criminal law topics including: entrapinent;8 the substantive law of fed-
eral crimes;· nonconstitutional aspects of the Federal Rules of Evidence;1i 
• Associate Professor of Law, Texas Tech University. Florida State University (B.S., 
1974); University of Florida (J.D., 1977). Member, State Bar of Florida. 
1. The matter of which former Fifth Circuit precedents bind the new Eleventh Circuit is 
summarized in Baker, A Primer on Precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, 1982 Eleventh Cir-
cuit Survey, 34 MERCER L. REv. 1175 (1983). See generally Baker, A Postscript on Prece-
dent in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 36 Sw. L.J. 725 (1982); Baker, Precedent Times 
Three: Stare Decisis in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 35 Sw. L.J. 687 (1981) [hereinafter cited 
as Baker, Precedent Times Three]. 
2. Baker, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 1981 Eleventh Circuit Survey, 33 MERCER 
L. REv. 1083 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Baker, Criminal Procedure]. 
3. This omission is a good example of the application of the constitutional and procedu-
ral criteria. The defense of entrapment itself fails both criteria. It is substantive rather than 
procedural, and the defense has no constitutional basis, but instead arises out of common 
law and statute. C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-AN ANALYSIS or CONSTITUTIONAL 
CASES AND CONCEPTS 564 (1980). But see United States v. Gianni, 678 F.2d 956, 959-60 
(11th Cir. 1982). During the survey period, the court approved an entrapment jury charge. 
United States v. Sonntag, 684 F.2d 781, 787 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Vadino, 680 
F.2d 1329, 1337 (11th Cir. 1982). Furthermore, application of the principle proved trouble-
some. E.g., United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 834-35 (11th Cir. 1982); Baucom v. Mar-
tin, 677 F.2d 1346, 1350-51 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Nicoll, 664 F.2d 1308, 1314 
(5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B). Nevertheless, adhering to the artificial limits of this article, these 
cases are only 'footnoteworthy.' 
4. E.g., United States v. Cuni, 689 F.2d 1353 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Hastings, 
681 F.2d 706 (11th Cir. 1982). 
5. E.g., United States v. Terebecki, 692 F.2d 1345 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. 
1241 
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nonconstitutional aspects of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure;8 
procedural aspects of relief in the nature of habeas corpus;? sentencing;8 
probation;8 parole;IO prisoners' rights;l1 and civil rights suits that alleged 
constitutional deprivations. III The procedural emphasis omits substantive 
constitutional protections.18 
This Article does not claim completeness even within the confines of 
constitutional criminal procedure. During the survey period,14 the courtUl 
decided hundreds of appeals in the general area. A gross grouping of 
these decisions yields the following subtopics for this Article: Arrests; 
Searches and Seizures; Self-Incrimination; Grand and Petit Jury Rights; 
and the Right to Counsel. These emphases mirror the court's 1982 dock-
et. If only in a 'footnoteworthy' way, the court did deal with other tradi-
tional constitutional criminal procedure topics such as the follow-
ing: double jeopardy;18 pretrial and trial identifications;l? speedy trials;18 
Clemons, 676 F.2d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B). 
6. E.g., United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 830-33 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Rice, 671 F.2d 455, 459-60 (11th Cir. 1982). 
7. E.g., Grizzell v. Wainwright, 692 F.2d 722 (11th Cir. 1982); Duvallon v. Florida, 691 
F.2d 483 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). 
8. E.g., United States v. Duran, 687 F.2d 348, 351-54 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 991-92 (11th Cir. 1982). 
9. E.g., United States v. O'Quinn, 689 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir. 1982); Owens v. Kelley, 681 
F.2d 1362 (11th Cir. 1982). 
10. E.g., Carlton v. Keohane, 691 F.2d 992 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); United States 
v. Pierre, 688 F.2d 724, 725-26 (11th Cir. 1982). 
11. E.g., Neman v. Alabama, 683 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1982); Hunter v. Florida Parole & 
Probation Comm'n, 674 F.2d 847 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). 
12. E.g., Spears v. Chandler, 672 F.2d 834 (lIth Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Staton v. Wain-
wright, 665 F.2d 686 (5th Cir.) (Unit B), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 909 (1982). 
13. E.g., United States v. Middleton, 690 F.2d 820, 822-26 (11th Cir. 1982). 
14. Jan. I, 1982, to Dec. 31, 1982. 
15. The generic reference 'the court' will be used throughout the remainder of this Arti-
cle. 'The court' is the appropriate reference to both the entire court of appeals and a partic-
ular panel. See Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247 (1953). When 
relevant, consideration by the en banc court will be distinguished from a three judge panel. 
16. E.g., United States v. Guilbert, 692 F.2d 1340, 1344-45 (11th Cir. 1982); Andiarena v. 
Keohane, 691 F.2d 993 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Sturman, 679 F.2d 840 (11th Cir. 
1982); United States v. Hayes, 676 F.2d 1359, 1362-66 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Bizzard, 674 F.2d 1382, 1385-86 (11th Cir. 1982). For a discllllSion of a typical year's double 
jeopardy decisions, see generally Baker, Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 1106-10. 
17. E.g., Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 410, 414 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B); United States 
v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641-44 (5th Cir.) (Unit B), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2300 (1982). 
18. E.g., United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356-60 (11th Cir. 1982); United States 
v. Solomon, 686 F.2d 863, 871-72 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 
837 n.12 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Bizzard, 674 F.2d 1382, 1386 (11th Cir. 1982); 
United States v. Pirolli, 673 F.2d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Gonzalez, 671 
F.2d 441 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2279 (1982). 
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discoveryjl9 the right to confrontationjllO guilty pleasjlll and bail.lIli The 
subtopics selected, however, dominated the court's docket, and they will 
dominate this discussion. 
II. ARREST 
Challenges to arrests, which constitutionally are nothing more than 
seizures of persons, cluster around three problems. IS First, the court 
must determine whether the fourth amendment to the United States 
Constitution applies at all, that is, whether the particular police-citizen 
contact was a seizure. Second, if a seizure occurred, the court must evalu-
ate the adequacy of the factual basis for the contact. Third, the court 
must consider the appropriateness of the actions taken by the govern-
ment actors. 
As was predicted in last year's survey,lI4 the en banc court in United 
States v. Berryll& rethought the analysis for determining when a police-
citizen contact rises to the level of a constitutional encroachment.· The 
court's analysis tracked the prior discussion in last year's Eleventh Cir-
cuit Constitutional Criminal Procedure Surveyll8 and may be summarized 
19. E.g., United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1337-41 (11th Cir. 1982); United 
States v. Freedman, 688 F.2d 1364 (11th Cir. 1982). 
20. This omiBBion is a good example of the effect of time and space restraints on the 
comprehensiveneBS of surveys such as this one. That there were more significant develop-
ments in other areas does not mean that there were no significant developments in the areas 
not discussed in the text. As the number of decisions and their parentheticals demonstrate, 
the failure to consider the right to confrontation is the result of poetic license and editorial 
judgment and nothing more. See, e.g., United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1355-56 (11th 
Cir. 1982) (disclosure of confidential informant); Foster v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 1382 (11th 
Cir. 1982) (exclusion of defendant); Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1251-61 (11th Cir. 
1982) (confrontation at capital sentencing hearing); United States v. Sonntag, 684 F.2d 781, 
788 (11th Cir. 1982) (scope of cr088-examination); James v. Wainright, 680 F.2d 102 (11th 
Cir. 1982) (use of prior testimony of deceased witneBB); United States v. Vadino, 680 F.2d 
1329, 1333-34 (11th Cir. 1982) (use of codefendant's statements); United States v. Hartley, 
678 F.2d 961, 972-74 (11th Cir. 1982) (hearsay); DeBenedictis v. Wainwright, 674 F.2d 841, 
843 (11th Cir. 1982) (wired informants recordings); Dickerson v. Alabama, 667 F.2d 1364, 
1369-71 (11th Cir. 1982) (compulsory proceBB); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 631-33 
(5th Cir.) (Unit B), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2300 (1982) (walver of confrontation right by 
murdering witneBS). 
21. E.g., Scarborough v. United States, 683 F.2d 1323 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Ammirato, 670 F.2d 552, 554-56 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B). 
22. E.g., United States v. Velez, 693 F.2d 1081 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. James, 
674 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1982). 
23. Baker, Criminal Procedure, surpa note 2, at 1085. 
24. [d. at 1086-87 n.25. 
25. 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B en banc), aff'g on rehearing 649 F.2d 385 (5th 
Cir. 1982) (Unit B). 
26. Baker, Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 1088. 
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here this year. The appeal concerned the 'Markonni modus operandi,' 
named for the Atlanta-based drug enforcement agent who has figured in a 
host of the leading.cases,Z7 and whose actions were involved in the airport 
confrontation in Berry.ss The court distilled from the precedents three 
categories of police-citizen encounters.29 What is reminiscent of a 'Steven 
Spielberg theory' of the fourth amendment distinguishes among the fol-
lowing: (1) police-citizen encounters of the first kind that involve no co-
ercion or detention; (2) police-citizens encounters of the second kind, 
sometimes called 'stops,' which are seizures of the person limited in dura-
tion and scope; and (3) police-citizen encounters of the third kind, which 
are full scale arrests.80 These theoretical levels have fourth amendment 
significance. The fourth amendment has no application to encounters of 
the first kind. Encounters of the second kind-stops-must be supported 
by an articulable reasonable suspicion. Encounters of the third 
kind-arrests-must be supported by probable cause.31 The en banc 
court first rejected the argument that all airport encounters were at least 
stops, since neither the governmental nor the individual interest 
predominated the constitutional balance.32 The court made every effort to 
narrow the definition of the police-citizen encounter of the first kind. 
These airport encounters do not invoke the fourth amendment "if of ex-
tremely restricted scope and conducted in a completely non-coercive 
manner."88 The court attempted to draw a line between "voluntary, unin-
trusive communications between police and citizens"84 versus "forced in-
terrogation by police that is so intrusive as to be a seizure."3G The degree 
27. "Indeed, the exploits of Special Agent Markollni are nearly legendary in this circuit." 
United States v. Ehlebracht, 693 F.2d 333, 335-36 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B) (citations 
omitted). 
28. 670 F.2d at 588-89. While the airport encounter has generated this line of precedent, 
the court's analysis applies beyond airports. See United States v. Hernandez, 668 F.2d 824, 
826-28 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B) (holding boats anchored in bay). 
29. 670 F.2d at 591. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 593. Recent Supreme Court precedent has been inconclusive. See generally 
Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). Two 
lines of Fifth Circuit precedent had developed. Compare Elmore v. United States, 595 F.2d 
1036 (5th Cir. 1970) (police-citizen airport encounter was not a stop) with United States v. 
Ballard, 573 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978) (suggesting that all police-citizen airport encounters 
were stops). In general, the court followed Elmore, which was described in last year's survey 
as the leading precedent. Baker, Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 1086-87. 
33. 670 F.2d at 594. Accord United States v. West, 651 F.2d 71 (lst Cir. 1981); United 
States v. Patino, 649 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1978). Contra United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 
F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1980). 
34. 670 F.2d at 595. 
35. Id. 
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of coercion is determined from all the circumstances and from the per-
spective of a reasonable person. The intent of the law enforcement offi-
cials is relevant only insofar as the citizen perceives their intent.88 
The en banc court acknowledged the inadequacy of any general guide-
lines, exhorted the district courts to be zealous in protecting the individ-
ual, and identified benchmarks of coercion: (1) Blocking the path or 
preventing the progress of the individual; (2) retaining a traveler's airline 
ticket; (3) statements by the officials that the traveler is suspected of 
smuggling drugs; (4) exhortations by the officials that an innocent person, 
who had nothing to hide, would cooperate; and (5) failure to inform the 
individual of the right to refuse to cooperate.87 
The court in Berry went on to discuss the second fourth amendment 
question whether there was an adequate factual basis for the contact once 
the encounter became a stop. The Constitution requires that the officials 
have an articulable, reasonable suspicion.88 Again, tracking the analysis in 
last year's survey, the en banc court considered the fourth amendment 
significance of the so-called drug courier profile.89 The profile is a list of 
primary and secondary characteristics that law enforcement officials use 
to identify drug couriers at airports.·o Last year's survey concluded that 
"the profile is a legitimate tool of law enforcement ... [and] [t]hat the 
characteristic is on a list of things to watch for is of no additional conse-
quence."4l The majority in Berry agreed.·s 
Taking advantage of the 'bully pulpit' of en banc opinion writing, the 
majority went on to consider the recurring issue in these cases of whether 
requiring nonconsenting individuals to accompany officials to an airport 
office was an encounter of the second or third kind, namely, a stop or an 
36. United States v. Jensen, 689 F.2d 1361, 1363 n.3 (11th Cir. 1982). The characteristics 
of the individual, such as age, intelligence, and education also are relevant. 670 F.2d at 597 
n.12. 
37. 670 F.2d at 597. 
38. Id. at 598-99. On the fourth amendment continuum of cause to seize, reasonable 
suspicion that would justify a stop is less cause than probable cause that would justify an 
arrest. United States v. McCulley, 673 F.2d 346, 351-52 (11th Cir. 1982). 
39. Compare 670 F.2d at 598-601 with Baker, Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 
1091-92. 
40. See generally United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980). The details of the profile change from airport to airport. 
United States v. Rico, 594 F.2d 320, 325 (2d Cir. 1979) (New York); United States v. Bal-
lard, 573 F.2d 913, 914-15 (5th Cir. 1978) (New Orleans); United States v. Craemer, 555 F.2d 
594, 595 (6th Cir. 1977) (Cleveland); United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717, 719-20 (6th 
Cir. 1977) (Detroit). 
41. Baker, Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 1091-92. 
42. 670 F.2d at 600-01. The court agreed with last year's survey suggestion that, al-
though the actual facts controlled, the officials' training and experience colored the signifi-
cance of partiCUlar details. 
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arrest. The court reasoned, first, that the balance of interests, individual 
versus government, weighed on the side of individual privacy and, second, 
that the rationale for a stop could not justify the additional intrusion of 
an office interrogation. Thus, forced office interviews were deemed en-
counters of the third kind-arrests-which require a probable cause fac-
tual basis under the fourth amendment.43 
All that was left of the majority's analysis in Berry was its application 
to the facts. 44 The facts in Berry and those cases following the en banc 
analysis highlight a difficulty in application!1I The real world problem of 
policing drug dealing exemplifies one of Professor Dershowitz's 'rules of 
the justice game': "It is easier to convict guilty defendants by violating 
the Constitution than by complying with it, and in some cases it is impos-
sible to convict guilty defendants without violating the Constitution. "48 
The en bane majority's theory has a certain appeal. Indeed, much the 
same theory appeared in these pages last year. Reality, however, has a 
certain way of overtaking theory. The majority in Berry revealed a re-
freshing skepticism of official claims of individuals' consent.47 Yet, the 
court either has overlooked or ignored the simple reality of how the three-
tired 'Spielberg analysis' works. The government camel's nose is in the 
fourth amendment tent when the officials initially contact the citizen, and 
the rest of the beast is not far behind. The encounter, for which the Con-
stitution holds out no protection, provides information to articulate a rea-
sonable suspicion for a stop, which, in turn, provides information to es-
tablish probable cause for an arrest or even some type of consent for a 
search. Drug couriers and law enforcement officials are not programmed 
by law review commentary or judicial opinions. Is all that is accomplished 
by such commentary and opinions the post hoc justification of what took 
place? Perhaps, here theory follows reality. Yet, the hierarchy of the 
Constitution is that reality should conform to the fourth amendment 
theory.48 
43. [d. at 601-02. Accord Florida v. Royer, 51 U.S.L.W. 4285 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1983). 
44. Factual issues of consent divided the court. Judge Hill concurred but not without 
reservation. [d. at 606 (Hill, J., dubitante). Judge Anderson, joined by Judge Fay, specially 
concurred. [d. Judge Clark dissented. [d. at 607. 
45. E.g., United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Jensen, 
689 F.2d 1361 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Elsoffer, 671 F.2d 1294, 1297-98 (11th Cir. 
1982); United States v. Rojas, 671 F.2d 159, 164-65 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B). 
46. A. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE xxi (1982). Several other of Dershowitz' rules 
also are implicated. 
47. "We think it strikingly unusual that so many individuals stopped !it airports consent 
to search while carrying drugs and even show where they have hidden drugs." 670 F.2d at 
598 n.16. See A. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 46, at xxii. Ct. United States v. Ehlebracht,693 
F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B) (consent was clearly voluntary). 
48. The third mentioned fourth amendment question-the appropriateneBB of the ac-
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III. SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
The fourth amendment protection "against unreasonable searches and 
seizures"48 only shields an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy 
from a government actor's intrusion. Several survey decisions involved 
this most basic tenet of fourth amendment jurisprudence. 
To state the obvious, the fourth amendment concerns only governmen-
tal searches and seizures. This truism was dispositive in one survey deci-
sion. When government agents investigating a stolen automobile ring in-
terviewed a daughter at her father's residence, her father produced 
documents on the vehicles and stated he wished to assist the investigation 
and to dissuade the agents from arresting his daughter.IIO In a later prose-
cution, father and daughter claimed the incident was a warrantless search 
and the government rejoined with a consent argument. The court did not 
reach those issues and held there was no search and seizure. III The father 
was only a private actor and was not the instrument or agent of the gov-
ernment. The fourth amendment does not protect against the adverse 
consequences of a private person's spontaneous, good faith effort to clear 
another.1I1 
When the fourth amendment inquiry shifts from the searcher and 
seizer to the place or thing searched and seized, the aggrieved individual 
must show that the government has encroached on a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. The inquiry is divided further into whether protected pri-
vacy has been intruded upon and whether the person claiming the instru-
sion should be heard to complain. Inevitably, the two inquiries become 
blurred in application. liS This blurring has resulted from relatively recent 
tions taken by the government actors-once again did not merit much of the court's atten-
tion during the survey period. E.g., United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009 (11th Cir. 1982) 
(search incident to arrest); United States v. Roper, 681 F.2d 1354, 1357-58 (11th Cir. 1982) 
(warrantless exigent arrest); United States v. Marszalkowski, 669 F.2d 655, 662-63 (11th Cir. 
1982) (warrantless arrest in home); United States v. Bulman, 667 F.2d 1374, 1382-84 (11th 
Cir. 1982) (warrantless arrest in motel room); United States v. Tolliver, 665 F.2d 1005, 1008 
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 935 (1982) (unannounced entry to arrest). See generally 
Baker, Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 1092. 
49. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
50. United States v. Burns, 662 F.2d 1378, 1384-85 (11th Cir. 1981). 
51. Id. at 1385. The case was reversed on a venue issue. Id. at 1380-83. This may have 
been the right result, but for the wrong reason. See United States v. Burns, 597 F.2d 939, 
944 (5th Cir. 1979) (held evidence sufficient). 
52. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 489-90 (1971). The court's state ac-
tion analysis reached the right result, but should have recognized that the father simply was 
not 'the state in sheep's clothing.' See Baker & Wood, "Taking" a Constitutional Look at 
the State Bar of Texas Proposal to Collect Interest on Attorney-Client Trust Accounts, 14 
TEx. TECH. L. REV. 327, 339 (1983). 
53. See generally C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 3, § 4.02, at 91 (1980). 
HeinOnline -- 34 Mercer L. Rev. 1248 1982-1983
1248 MERCER LA W REVIEW [Vol. 34 
Supreme Court pronouncements that dismantled the law of standing and 
erected in its place an analytical framework of privacy. For a time, a 
criminal charge of possession against a defendant automatically qualified 
him to challenge the search for and seizure of the contraband. II. The auto-
matic qualification has been abolishedjllll ownership alone will not suf-
fice. lltl A spate of recent Supreme Court decisions has replaced the 'stand-
ing' slogan with a privacy analysis bottomed on the policy that underlies 
the fourth amendment.1I7 The new constitutional litmus is whether the 
search and seizure violated the defendant's legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy.OB Thus, there is no longer a separate 'standing' analysis, although 
the slogan persists, and the privacy inquiry is informed by standing lore.1I9 
Applications of this privacy test are as varied as the factual situations 
from which they arise. It is, perhaps, inevitable then that these decisions 
have a certain ad hoc character. A few examples are illustrative. A defen-
dant convicted of threatening the life of the president-elect could not 
claim any privacy intrusion when correctional officials opened the threat-
ening letter written while he was incarcerated, since he should have ex-
pected that it would be opened by someone before it reached the ad-
dressee.so Crewmen had no legitimate claim of privacy in their ship's 
common areas where Coast Guard officials found contraband while con-
ducting a safety, documentation, and customs check.tll In another case a 
defendant disclaimed any knowledge or ownership of a suitcase, at the 
time of the seizure, and thereby disclaimed any legitimate expectation of 
privacy in its contents.tllI Defendant, who was prosecuted along with sev-
54. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 259-67 (1960). 
55. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). 
56. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-06 (1980). 
57. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-35 (1978). See generally Burkoff, Not 
So Private Searches and the Constitution, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 627, 635-43 (1981); Tucker 
& Wolinski, Expectations of Privacy: Fourth Amendment Legitimacy Through State 
Law, '16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1981). 
58. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978). 
59. The Supreme Court has attempted to rid the reports of the slogan in fourth amend-
ment cases. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980); United States v. 
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 89, 90-93 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-40 (1978). The Elev-
enth Circit seems to be reluctant to give up the familiar. E.g., United States v. Vadino, 680 
F.2d ~329, 1335 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Glen-Archila, 677 F.2d 809, 813 n.6 (11th 
Cir. 1982); United States v. McCulley, 673 F.2d 346, 352 (11th Cir. 1982). 
60. United States v. Wilson, 671 F.2d 1291, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 1982). 
61. United States v. Stuart-Caballero, 686 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir. 1982); United States 
v. Glen-Archila, 677 F.2d 809, 813 n.5 (11th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court has agreed to 
consider the issue. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 652 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(Unit A), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3963 (U.S. June 7, 1982) (No. 81-1350). 
62. United States v. Hawkins, 681 F.2d 1343, 1345-46 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Pirolli, 673 F.2d 1200, 1203-04 (11th Cir. 1982). A mere passive failure to claim incriminat-
ing evidence, on the other hand, may not extinguish a preexisting privacy interest. See Wal-
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eral others for conspiracy to possess narcotics, did not show sufficient 
ownership or control of the house he was in to claim a protected privacy 
interest when the government agent answered a phone call from a defen-
dant's wife, which led to incriminating evidence.83 Two codefendants 
would not be heard to complain about a warrantless search of an automo-
bile rented by a third codefendant even though they had agreed to share 
the rental expense.84 
The most interesting survey decision that concerned the legitimacy of 
expectations of privacy came in Owens v. Kelley.8D The question on first 
impression was whether the fourth amendment's proscription of unrea-
sonable searches and seizures was violated by a condition of probation 
that allowed warrantless searches by probation supervisors and law en-
forcement officers.88 A probation condition must be reasonable to be con-
stitutional. Reasonableness is determined by three factors: (1) The pur-
poses of probation; (2) the extent to which a probationer's status 
compromises the probationer's constitutional rights; and (3) legitimate 
needs of law enforcement.87 By enhancing law enforcement surveillance 
ability, the condition thereby discouraged unlawful possession and pro-
vided a practical mechanism for monitoring rehabilitation. The search 
condition thus satisfied the first and third factor. Basic privacy policy 
controlled the second factor. A criminal conviction provides a compelling 
state interest to incarcerate and also diminishes the individual's expecta-
tion of privacy. Unlike a law abiding citizen's legitimate expectation of 
privacy, a probationer'S lesser legitimate expectation is not violated by a 
condition of probation that permits warrantless searches of his person 
and property by probation supervisors and law enforcement officers." Al-
ter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 658 n.11 (1980). 
63. United States v. Vandino, 680 F.2d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 1982). 
64. United States v. McCulley, 673 F.2d 346, 352 (11th Cir. 1982). The court concluded 
that the third codefendant could make the challenge but upheld the search. ld. at 352. 
65. 681 F.2d 1362 (11th Cir. 1982). 
66. The condition stated: 
Probationer shall submit to a search of his person, houses, papers, and/or effects 
as these terms of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution are 
defined by the courts, any time of the day or night with or without a search war-
rant whenever requested to do so by a Probation Supervisor or any law enforce-
ment officer and specifically consents to the use of anything seized as evidence in a 
proceeding to revoke this order of probation. 
ld. at 1366. Thus, the decision is relevant to the consent to search cases. See infra text 
accompanying notes 100-109. 
67. 681 F.2d at 1366. Although Owens u. Kelley concerned a state conviction and state 
probation, the court applied the test developed for constitutional challenges on federal pro-
bation conditions. See United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 150 (5th Cir. 1979). 
68. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 
471, 480 (1972). 
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though the court declined to impose a requirement of reasonable suspi-
cion precedent to a search, it was careful to hold that any search under 
the condition must be conducted in a reasonable manner and for a proba-
tionary purpose. Searches designed for law enforcement purposes or 
meant to harass or intimidate are not permitted. Thus, such a condition 
is constitutional on its face but may be challenged as applied when there 
are abuses. This result is consistent with the denouement of the notion 
that probation and parole are merely privileges. Probationers and parol-
ees are provided some measure of fourth amendment protection. The rea-
sonableness clause of the fourth amendment protects them against gov-
ernmental action that, in context, is arbitrary and abusive.89 
As was true during the last survey, the court was more concerned with 
whether warrantless searches were justified than with searches under war-
rant.70 Concerning the warrant itself, a few survey decisions applied well-
worn precedents.71 The court's treatment of administrative warrants, 
however, was noteworthy. Administrative inspection searches generally 
require a warrant, although for purposes of the fourth amendment they 
are sufficiently unique to be treated separately.72 The first survey decision 
on administrative searches concerned a bank's refusal to cooperate with a 
compliance review under an executive order that prohibited discrimina-
tion by government contractors. This refusal resulted in the termination 
of the contracts.78 The bank admitted that it contracted voluntarily and 
that it expressly agreed to be bound by the executive order, including the 
responsibility to furnish information and reports on compliance with the 
affirmative action requirement. The bank urged, however, that the con-
sent did not include unreasonable or otherwise unconstitutional searches 
69. S. KRANTZ, THE LAW OF CORRECTIONS AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS 660 (2d ed. 1980). 
70. Baker, Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 1096. Last year's troubling general ob-
servation holds true again. The court seems more concerned with whether the official con-
duct in the particular search was reasonable, with or without a warrant, than it is concerned 
with the competing orientation-whether the officials were reasonable in acting without a 
warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 671 F.2d 1291, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 1982). 
71. See, e.g., United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1348-50 (11th Cir. 1982) (par-
ticularity of description of things to be seized); United States V. Strauss, 678 F.2d 886, 892-
93 (11th Cir. 1982) (particularity of description of things to be seized and probable cause for 
warra~t); United States V. Lockett, 674 F.2d 843 (11th Cir. 1982) (sufficiency of affidavit 
supporting warrant); United States V. Flynn, 664 F.2d 1296, 1301-06 (5th Cir. 1982) (Former 
5th) (sufficiency of affidavit supporting warrant). 
72. See generally C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 3, § 5.06, at 125-33 (unique nature of ad-
ministrative searches has lead to a distinct body of law). 
73. First Ala. Bank V. Donovan, 692 F.2d 714 (11th Cir. 1982). Exec. Order No. 11,246,3 
C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e at 1232-36 (1976), and accompanying 
regulations forbade discrimination on the basis of race, sex, color, religion, or national origin 
by government contractors and required annual reporting on affirmative action efforts. 692 
F.2d 714, 716 n.1 (11th Cir. 1982). 
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designed to harass and to oppress. The government agreed, but issue was 
joined when the government urged that the particular administrative 
searches were legitimate. The bank lost. The court balanced the bank's 
privacy interest, diminished by the small reporting burden and the bank's 
own agreement, with a heightened national policy in favor of equal em-
ployment opportunity. Three factors controlled.74 First, the particular 
compliance review was authorized by statute. Second, the review was 
properly limited in scope. Third, the review was pursuant to an adminis-
trative plan that contained specific neutral criteria: the Department of 
Labor's plan to focus on the banking industry and review compliance by 
banks with more than fifty employees and $50,000 in government 
contracts.711 
Two survey decisions considered administrative procedures for Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) inspection warrants. In 
the first, West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan,78 the district court 
granted a preliminary injunction that stayed the execution of an OSHA 
inspection warrant. The court vacated the injunction and held for the 
agency.77 Administrative warrants must be supported by administrative 
probable cause, a lesser showing of probable cause than is required for 
criminal search warrants.78 The issuing magistrate must balance the gov-
ernmental need for the search against the individual invasion the search 
requires. The court concluded that there was sufficient specific evidence 
of a violation when the sworn application was based on an employee peti-
tion, employees' letters, and summaries of employee interviews that de-
scribed specific violations of the applicable safety regulations.79 Having 
found the requisite administrative probable cause,80 the court upheld the 
scope of the administrative warrant. The Constitution was satisfied since 
the scope of the administrative search warrant bore a reasonable relation-
ship to the underlying employee complaints.81 
74. 692 F.2d 714, 721 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing United States v. Mississippi Power & Light 
Co., 638 F.2d 899 (5th Cir. Mar. 6, 1981) (Unit A), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981)). 
75. 692 F.2d 714, 721 (11th Cir. 1982). Reasonableness may be based either on particular 
evidence of an actual violation, on reasonable administrative or legislative standards, or on a 
neutral administrative plan. 638 F.2d 899, 907-08. See generally Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 
436 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1978); Note, Rationalizing Administrative Searches, 77 MICH. L. REV. 
1291 (1979). 
76. 689 F.2d 950 (11th Cir. 1982). 
77. [d. at 963. 
78. See generally Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1978). 
79. 689 F.2d at 957. 
80. The decision also analyzed the procedures for a district court review of the magis-
trate's warrant issuance and the role of the appellate court in such situations. See id. at 956-
62; see also id. at 963-64 (Roney, J., concurring). 
81. The court had never addressed the standard for determining the permissible scope of 
an administrative search> based on specific employee complaints. 689 F.2d at 962. Of the 
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In the second decision, Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete CO.,81 the gov-
ernment petitioned for review of the decision of the Occupational Safety 
and Health Review Commission (Commission) that vacated a citation is-
sued against an allegedly offending employer. The Commission had sup-
pressed evidence obtained pursuant to an administrative search warrant 
that authorized a full scope inspection on the basis of a specific employee 
complaint. In a thoughtful discussion of the administrative search war-
rant and the fourth amendment, the court clarified the policy issues and 
described the framework for analysis. When deciding the appropriateness 
of a Commission decision to suppress evidence, the court of appeals is to 
be guided by four principles.8s First, the Commission may independently 
evaluate the administrative probable cause determination of a federal 
magistrate in deciding the admissibility of evidence gathered under the 
warrant at an administrative hearing. Second, an administrative warrant 
based only on a particular employee complaint that concerns a specific 
existing violation must be subjected to an individualized judicial inquiry 
into whether the subsequent inspection went no further than was re-
quired to determine the validity of the complaint.84 Third, the Commis-
sion may apply an exclusionary rule in OSHA proceedings to protect 
fourth amendment rights.811 Fourth, the Commission could refuse to di-
lute the deterrent impact of the administrative exclusionary rule by re-
jecting the so-called 'good faith' exception.8s Thus, in these three cases 
the court has reaffirmed the fourth amendment principle that a warrant 
is the rule and the warrantless search the exception.87 
courts which have considered the issue, some have held that the scope of the inspection 
must be limited to the alleged violations, while others have not imposed the relevancy limit. 
Compare Marshall v. North Am. Car Co., 626 F.2d 320 (3d Cir. 1980) (scope of inspection 
had some relationship to alleged violations in employee complaint) with Burkart Randall 
Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir. 1980) (scope not limited to specific 
complaints). Since the warrant sub judice met the narrower test, the court declined to 
choose between the two approaches. 689 F.2d at 963. A later survey panel decided the issue 
in favor of the narrower test. Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061, 1068-69 
(11th Cir. 1982) (See infra text accompanying notes 82-87). 
82. 693 F.2d 1061 (11th Cir. 1982). 
83. Id. at 1063. 
84. See supra note 81. 
85. See generally Trant, OSHA and the Exclusionary Rule: Should the Employer Go 
Free Because the Compliance Officer Has Blundered, 1981 DUKE L.J. 667. But cf. United 
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (exclusionary rule not extended to civil case). 
86. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840-48 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981). See generally Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 70 (1982); LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing 
"Bright Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U. Prrr. L. REv. 307 (1982). 
87. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978). But see supra text accompany-
ing notes 70-71. 
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Three types of constitutional warrantless searches predominated the 
survey docket: searches incident to a lawful arrest, consent searches, 
and border searches.88 The remainder of this section is devoted to these 
warrant exceptions. 
The rationale of the warrant exception for searches incident to arrest 
defines the permissible scope of the search. When making a valid arrest, a 
law enforcement official may search the person and the area within the 
immediate control of the arrestee for weapons, evidence that might be 
destroyed, or contraband.88 The arrest-search sequence is not critical. 
The search incident may precede formal arrest as long as probable cause 
existed absent the result of the search, and a formal arrest immediately 
follows the search.80 Under the circumstances of an airport stop,81 a bulge 
of unusual size and shape in a defendant's trousers provided probable 
cause to arrest, and the search of his person was incident to his arrest 
when the bulge proved to be cocaine.811 The subsequent search of a defen-
dant's wallet that had been taken from him upon arrest was sufficiently 
incident to the arrest.88 It mattered not that several hours elapsed or that 
the defendant had been booked between arrest and ·wallet search.84 These 
decisions cloud the contemporaneous requirement of searches temporally 
and locally incident to arrest.811 The basic requirement that the arrest be 
lawful to support the incident warrantless search can be problematical. 
Even when an initial arrest was unlawful, once a defendant struggled and 
tried to flee, his recapture supported an arrest for resisting the first ar-
rest, and the warrantless search was incident to the second lawful arrest." 
Following the Supreme Court's lead,87 the court refused.U; allow an inci-
dent search for the arrestee to precede the arrest. Warrantless entry of a 
88. A few of the other warrant exceptions were considered in routine analyses. E.g., 
United States v. Kent, 691 F.2d 1376, 1381-84 (11th Cir. 1982) (plain view search); United 
States v. Gianni, 678 F.2d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1982) (automobile search); United States v. 
Bosby, 675 F.2d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 1982) (inventory search); United States V. Rojas, 671 
F.2d 159, 163-67 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B) (exigent search). See also generally Baker, crimi-
nal Procedure, supra note 2, at 1096-110l. 
89. United States V. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 
762-63 (1969). 
SO. Rawlings V. Kentucky. 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 (1980). 
91. See supra notes 25-48 and accompanying text. 
92. United States V. Elsoffer, 671 F.2d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 1982). 
93. United States V. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374, 1383-84 (11th Cir. 1982). 
94. United States V. Sonntag, 684 F.2d 781, 785-86 (11th Cir. 1982). 
95. Compare Preston V. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (search too remote to be 
incidental to arrest) with United States V. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974) (search found to be 
incident to arrest). 
96. United States V. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009 (11th Cir. 1982). 
97. Payton V. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
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home or a hotel room to effect an arrest defies the fourth amendment.98 
The Eleventh Circuit has expanded the searchable area to allow for a se-
curity check of the situs of arrest when there is reason to suspect that 
there are others present who pose a threat to the officials.99 
As an exception to the warrant requirement, consent to be searched is 
analyzed along three axes: (1) Whether the consent is valid; (2) whether 
the search exceeded the scope of the consent; and (3) whether the appro-
priate person gave the consent.100 The validity of consent is considered in 
the totality of the circumstances. Although none alone is controlling, 
some of the relevant factors are the degree of voluntariness of defendant's 
custodial status, the presence of coercive police procedures, the extent 
and level of defendant's general cooperation with the police, defendant's 
awareness of the right to refuse consent, defendant's education and intel-
ligence, and the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be 
found. lol The decisions have something of an ad hoc character as a re-
sult. loll Even a defendant's consent to be searched may be unreasonable 
under the fourth amendment if the officials induced the consent by de-
ceit, trickery, or misrepresentation. A subsequent allegation that a prior 
consent was attained wrongfully must show clearly and convincingly that 
the official materially misrepresented the nature of the inquiry. lOS The 
distinction in the decisions seems to be between officials who misrepre-
sent their official status and officials who make no representation of their 
status; this curious distinction somehow amounts to a difference. One line 
of cases concerns everyone's favorite official, the tax collector. Although 
special agents provide explicit warnings concerning possible criminal lia-
98. United States v. Roper, 681 F.2d 1354, 1357-58 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Bulman, 667 F.2d 1374, 1382-84 (11th Cir. 1982). 
99. United States v. Roper, 681 F.2d 1354, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 1982). 
100. Baker, Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 1097. 
101. United States v. Robinson, 690 F.2d 869, 874-77 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1023 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B). 
102. Compare United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B en banc) 
(airport consent voluntary) with United States v. Robinson, 690 F.2d 869 (11th Cir. 1982) 
(airport consent involuntary). See also United States v. Rojas, 671 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(Unit B). Last year's survey noted the low level of voluntariness required by quoting one of 
the cC'urt's asides: "He was not intoxicated, was not handcuffed, and was not threatened 
with a shotgun." Baker, Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 1097 n.1oo (quoting United 
States v. Webb, 633 F.2d 1140, 1142 (5th Cir. Jan. 5, 1981». This year the court went one 
better in saying "Sorry Charlie" to a member of the infamous 'Black Tuna' marijuana smug-
gling enterprise. The court concluded consent was voluntary, stressing "the circumstances 
in this case are unique and . . . it is most unusual that consent given at gunpoint can ever 
be found, to be voluntary." United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1024 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(Unit B). 
103. See generally United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299-300 (5th Cir. 1977); United 
States v. Dawson, 486 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1973). 
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bility in taxpayer confrontations, in routine civil audits revenue agents do 
not. Thus, the taxpayer consents to cooperate with the revenue agent who 
turns over serious cases to the special agent for a criminal prosecution, 
and the taxpayer is not heard to complain about the original consent. 104 
There was no material representation regarding the official's status. Com-
pare another line of cases in which the suspect consented but was igno-
rant that the person given the permission to search had any official sta-
tus. Undercover agents often go where neither warrant nor probable cause 
would take them, yet they do so with the unwitting permission of the 
defendant. 1011 The court broadly construed the consent given an agent 
provocateur and found, by analogizing to wiretap cases, that it legiti-
mated a search by the undercover agent and another government offi-
ciap08 Straining reason by the analogy, the court concluded that by giv-
ing the undercover agent permission to enter an apartment and acquire 
contraband, the suspect somehow assumed the risk that the undercover 
agent would reveal the information and pass on the consent to a regular 
agent who would aid the search.l07 The result is at odds with the prece-
dent and logic of the situation. In the wiretap and wired informant cases, 
the Supreme Court has concluded that transmitting conversations to 
agents located elsewhere was similar to the undercover agent's later reve-
lation of the conversation, at least for fourth amendment cases.108 The 
consent to enter given the undercover agent was narrower than the search 
conducted by the regular agent. IOe 
Unlike the second consent search inquiry-the scope of the con-
sent 11°-the third issue-whether the appropriate person con-
sented-proved troublesome during the survey period. Third party con-
sent, that is, consent by someone other than the person against whom the 
seized evidence is used, will suffice if the third party has a sufficient pri-
vacy interest in common with the defendant.lll A partner in an illicit 
104. United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1347-48 (11th Cir. 1982). 
105. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 209-11 (1966); United States v. Enstam, 
622 F.2d 857, 867-68 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981). 
106. United States v. Schuster, 684 F.2d 744 (11th Cir. 1982). 
107. [d. at 747-49. 
108. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748-54 (1971); United States v. Brand, 
556 F.2d 1312, 1318 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978). 
109. Judge Johnson's dissent has the better of precedent and logic, but not the second 
vote. United States v. Schuster, 684 F.2d 744, 749 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
110. The court will interpret the scope of the consent broadly enough to cover the scope 
of most searches arguably within the range of consent. See, e.g., United States v. Schuster, 
684 F.2d 744, 748 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1352-53 (11th 
Cir. 1982). 
111. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169-72 (1974); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 
U.S. 731, 740 (1969). 
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drug business could consent to an entry into a partner's apartment for a 
drug transaction. 111 The government did not violate the fourth amend-
ment by recording and transmitting private conversations with the con-
sent of only one of the parties, because the Constitution does not protect 
a wrongdoer's misplaced confidentiality. liS 
Border searches sometimes are sanctioned as an exception to the war-
rant clause. Searches at the border or its functional equivalent are more 
accurately justified on the theory that an individual crossing our coun-
try's international boundary has no reasonable expectation of a searchless 
passage. ll4 The law of border searching has become rather routine. lUI 
The antecedent question of the applicability of border search law at-
tracted some court attention during the survey period. More particularly, 
the court considered the where and when of border crossings, namely the 
location of and the nexus with an international boundary which together 
justify the search and seizure. 116 
For example, a nonstop flight from outside the United States, in effect, 
brings the border with it, and passengers and cargo are subject to customs 
search at the point of destination.11'J The court has waffled on the legal 
issue of the degree of proof required to establish a border crossing, some-
times referring to a 'high degree of probability' or 'preponderance of evi-
dence' or 'reasonable suspicion.'1I8 The Eleventh Circuit resolved the con-
fusion in a survey decision, United States v. Garcia.lIs The Government 
must demonstrate a substantial likelihood that the trip terminating 
within the country originated in a foreign country.l20 Obviously, this in-
quiry is fact-bound. A private aircraft under a flight plan with a domestic 
point of origin cannot be searched without some showing that the plane 
112. See United States v. Sonntag, 684 F.2d 781, 785-86 (11th Cir. 1982). 
113. United States v. Shields, 675 F.2d 1152, 1157-58 (11th Cir. 1982). Compare supra 
text accompanying notes 104-109. 
114. Baker, Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 1098. 
115. See, e.g., United States v. Bustos-Guzman, 685 F.2d 1278 (11th Cir. 1982); United 
States v. Marino·Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Alonso, 673 F.2d 
334 (11th Cir. 1982). 
116. The textual discussion considers the where and when of the border crossing. Once 
the international boundary is crossed, more intrusive search techniques require higher de-
grees of suspicion to justify the warrantless search. The court has recognized three distinct 
kinds of border searches of persons: simple frisks and pat-downs, strip searches, and body-
cavity searches. See United States v. DeGutierrez, 667 F.2d 16, 18-19 (11th Cir. 1982); see 
also United States v. Sandler, 644 F.2d 1163, 1166-67 (5th Cir. May 15, 1981) (en bane) 
(discussed in Baker, Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 1098-99). 
117. United States v. Messersmith, 692 F.2d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 1982). 
118. United States v. Stone, 659 F.2d 569, 573 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit B). 
119. 672 F.2d 1349 (11th Cir. 1982). 
120. ld. at 1358; see also United States v. Messersmith, 692 F.2d 1315, 1318 (11th Cir. 
1982). 
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had deviated from its stated course. In contrast, a plane, flying without a 
flight plan and without notification, that pierced the air defense identifi-
cation zone travelling from southeast of the United States was searcha-
ble. l2l Furthermore, the border search rationale has been extended func-
tionally.In one decision, the plane's signals first registered over foreign 
airspace. Visual contact occurred over United States waters, and customs 
officials intercepted the plane and followed it in for a landing. Govern-
ment officials could infer an earlier border crossing and an observed first 
landing.1I2 In a second decision, the court explored the limits of the bor-
der search rationale. A vehicle may be border searched for contraband or 
dutiable goods, though it has not crossed the border, if it has come in 
contact with someone or something that has crossed the border, and the 
object of the search has been observed continuously since that contact. Ilia 
IV. SELF-INCRIMINATION 
During the survey period, applications of the fifth amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination involved a few novel principles,124 voluntari-
ness,l2& some peculiar nuances of the Miranda doctrine,1I6 and the peren-
nial problem of prosecutorial comments.lll7 Only the decisions on Mi-
randa and prosecutorial comments deserve mention here. 
In Miranda v. Arizona,1I8 the Supreme Court held inadmissible all 
"statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custo-
dial interrogation of the defendant unless [the prosecution] demonstrates 
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against 
121. 672 F.2d at 1358. 
122. United States v. Flynn, 664 F.2d 1296, 1306 (5th Cir.) (Former 5th), cert. denied, 
456 U.S. 930 (1982). 
123. United States v. Lueck, 678 F.2d 895 (11th Cir. 1982). The court held that the 
Government must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the object of the search 
crossed the border. [d. at 902. But see supra text accompanying notes 120-22. 
124. See, e.g., United States v. Fortin, 685 F.2d 1297 (11th Cir. 1982) (guilty plea waived 
privilege regarding crime pleaded but not extraneous perjury); Rowe v. Griffin, 676 F.2d 524 
(11th Cir. 1982) (evidence of guilt induced by Government promise of immunity is coerced 
and inadmissible); United States v. Pilcher, 672 F.2d 875, 877 (11th Cir. 1982) (taxpayer 
may not assert privilege to justify failure to file tax return); United States v. Watson, 669 
F.2d 1374, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982) (jury instruction on right not to testify). 
125. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 685 F.2d 142 (5th Cir, 1982) (Unit B) (statement 
voluntary under all the circumstances); Acosta v. Turner, 666 F.2d 949, 959 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(Unit B) (procedures for determining voluntariness of confession); Sullivan v. Alabama, 666 
F.2d 478, 482-83 (11th Cir. 1982) (voluntariness requires mental competency). See generally 
Baker, Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 1101-02. 
126. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
127. See Baker, Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 1105-06. 
128. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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self-incrimination."129 Defendant in United States v. Contreras130 raised 
the issue of the adequacy of his warning compared to the famous litany 
composed by the Supreme Court. 131 Contreras relied on a 1968 Fifth Cir-
cuit decision132 to claim that his warning was deficient in failing to ap-
prise him of his right to have counsel appointed immediately and prior to 
any questioning. Following its first duty of obeisance to Supreme Court 
precedent,133 the court considered California v. Prysock,134 a 1981 deci-
sion that effectively overruled the former Fifth Circuit rule.136 The panel 
went on to uphold the standard Customs and Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration (DEA) warnings that informed defendant of his right to consult 
with an attorney prior to questioning, to have an attorney present during 
questioning, and to have counsel appointed. ls8 As long as the warning 
does not condition the right on some future event, the accused need not 
be told expressly that the right to appointed counsel is 'here and now'.187 
The remaining survey Miranda decisions involved determining whether 
129. [d. at 444. 
130. 667 F.2d 976 (11th Cir. 1982). 
131. The accused must be informed that: 
he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in 
a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he 
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if 
he so desires. 
384 U.S. at 479. 
132. Lathers v. United States, 396 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1968). 
133. See Gresham Park Community Org. v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227, 1234 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(Unit B); see also Baker, Precedent Times Three, supra note I, at 723. 
134. 453 U.S. 355 (1981). 
135. 667 F.2d at 979. 
136. Upon arrest, defendant was read his rights in Spanish. He answered each para-
graph orally stating that he understood his rights and signed a written waiver. The trans-
lated Customs warnings stated: . 
You have the right to consult your attorney before making any statement or an-
swering any question, and you can have your attorney present while we interro-
gate you. 
If you want an attorney but cannot pay for one on your own, the United States 
Magistrate in this city or in the Federal Court will assign you an attorney free of 
charge. 
[d. at 978. The translated Drug Enforcement Administration warnings stated: 
[d. 
You have the right to consult an attorney before making any statement or answer-
ing any question posed to you,and he can be present at the interrogation. 
You have the right to be represented by an attorney who will be appointed by 
the United States federal magistrate or court in the event of insolvency on your 
part. 
137. [d. at 979. For examples of conditional and, hence, deficient warnings see United 
States v. Garcia, 431 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1970); Gilpin v. United States, 415 F.2d 638, 640-41 
(5th Cir. 1969). 
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a suspect has been subjected to custodial interrogation, which engages the 
duty to warn, waiver rules, and the harmless error doctrine. When a sus-
pect is in custody and what constitutes interrogation are separate inquir-
ies. Something less than a full blown arrest may satisfy the custody re-
quirement if the investigation has focussed on the accused, and both the 
official and the suspect subjectively view their relationship as custodial.138 
An armed Coast Guard boarding of a vessel on the high seas obviously 
was custodial.138 It was just as obvious, at least to the court, that an Inter-
nal Revenue Service interview during a criminal investigation did not 
trigger a duty to warn as long as the surroundings were familiar to the 
suspect, who freely accompanied agents for one hour of questioning with-
out any evidence of restraint or coercion.140 
Once custody envelops a suspect, however, the warnings must be given 
only if an interrogation or its functional equivalent occurs. Lebowitz v. 
Wainwright l4l is the lone survey decision on the issue worth noting.1U 
The issue in Lebowitz concerned whether a suspect's silence during a 
search could be used for impeachment purposes. The court had to inter-
polate two Supreme Court precedents. In Doyle v. Ohio,143 the Supreme 
Court held that the use of postarrest and postwarning silence as impeach-
ment was unfair. Later, in Jenkins v. Anderson,1H the Supreme Court 
distinguished Doyle and held that the use of silence before any police 
contact as impeachment was permitted. The facts in Lebowitz fell in be-
tween those of Doyle and Jenkins. 146 While the court declined to describe 
just how much governmental action encouraging silence was necessary to 
make a comment on the silence impermissible, there was not enough in 
138. See United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1071 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane), cert. 
denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980). See generally Baker, Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 
1103 (three-prong test for custodial setting). 
139. United States v. Glen-Archila. 677 F.2d 809, 814 n.12 (11th Cir. 1982); cf. United 
States v. Gray, 659 F.2d 1296, 1301 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit B) (Coast Guard's routine stop, 
boarding, and inspection on the high seas did not create a custodial setting). 
140. United States v. Wright, 685 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B) (per curiam). See 
supra text accompanying notes 100-109. 
141. 670 F.2d 974 (11th Cir. 1982). 
142. See also, e.g., United States v. Glen-Archila, 677 F.2d 809, 814 (11th Cir. 1982); 
Sullivan v. Alabama, 666 F.2d 478, 483 (11th Cir. 1982). See generally Baker, Criminal Pro-
cedure, supra note 2, at 1103-04. 
143. 426 U.S. 610, 616-18 (1976). 
144. 447 U.S. 231, 238-40 (1980). 
145. On a time line, in sequence: Alleged Crime ... Jenkins (Comment on silence 
proper) ... Contact with Police ... Lebowitl ... Arrest ... Miranda Warning ... 
Doyle (Comment on silence improper). 670 F.2d at 979. Some courts had used arrest as the 
bright line, permitting comment on silence before arrest and prohibiting comment on silence 
after. See United States ex reI. Smith v. Frazen, 660 F.2d 237, 239 (7th Cir. 1981); Bradley 
v. Jago, 594 F.2d 1100, 1103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979). 
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the case sub judice. The police arrived at defendant's home, told him and 
his family to stay in one room, and proceeded to execute a search war-
rant. Under these circumstances, the prosecutor could argue to the jury 
that defendant's silence during the search was a guilty silence that im-
peached his trial explanation concerning his possession of stolen goods 
eventually found during the search.148 
Even if the custody and interrogation requirements engage the Mi-
randa protection, the properly warned suspect may either expressly or 
implicitly waive the right to remain silent, and any inculpatory or falsely 
exculpatory statement will be admissible. l47 When the suspect asserts 
either the right to have counsel present or the right to remain silent, all 
questioning must cease. Although invoking the former right absolutely 
bars resumption of questioning, invoking the latter only interrupts the 
questioning. l48 Finally, even if custodial interrogation takes place with-
out following the dictates of the Miranda doctrine, the error may be 
deemed harmless. 149 
Once again, the court considered what in last year's survey was called 
"the perennial problem of trial comments about the failure of a criminal 
defendant to testify in his own defense. "1110 To reach the harmful error 
threshold, it must appear either that the speaker's manifest intention was 
to comment on the accused's failure to take the stand or that the charac-
ter of the remark naturally and inevitably would be taken as such an im-
proper comment.11I1 Although direct and indirect comments are forbid-
den, in context it is the directness of the remark that is controlling. On 
the first level, the court is loathe to posit bad faith on the part of a prose-
cutor. On the second level, prosecutors read advance sheets, and they 
know which remarks will pass appellate review. When the effective test 
becomes, "How indirect was it?," the court almost always seems to an-
swer "It was so indirect, we affirm." Viewing the decided cases en masse, 
the Eleventh Circuit tolerates indirect remarks that just as easily could 
be held reversible error under the announced test. 1II1 As it has developed, 
146. 670 F.2d at 979-81. 
147. United States v. Glen-Archila, 677 F.2d 809, 814-16 (11th Cir. 1982); United States 
v. McCulley, 673 F.2d 346, 351 (11th Cir. 1982); Sullivan v. Alabama, 666 F.2d 478, 482-83 
(11th Cir. 1982). 
148. United States v. Bosby, 675 F.2d 1174, 1182 (11th Cir. 1982) (discussing Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) and Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96 (1975)). 
149. United States v. Roper, 681 F.2d 1354, 1359 (11th Cir. 1982); Sullivan v. Alabama, 
666 F.2d 478, 484-85 (11th Cir. 1982). 
150. Baker, Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 1105. 
151. See United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 983 (11th Cir. 1982); Williams v. Wain-
wright, 673 F.2d 1182, 1184-85 (l1thCir. 1982). 
152. See, e.g., United States v. Stuart-Caballero, 686 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir. 1982) 
(Opening: "The defendants mayor may not have a different version [of the ease). This is 
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such remarks have become a low percentage appellate issue. illS 
V. GRAND AND PETIT JURY RIGHTS 
Besides a few decisions that contained general jury issues/a. the most 
noteworthy survey decisions concerned selection procedures for grand and 
petit juries. IIIO There is a reason to consider the two together. lOS Of course, 
the Constitution does not require that a state criminal system provide for 
a grand jury.101 If a state does provide for a grand jury,. however, consti-
tutional standards must be satisfied.1II8 The constitutional requirements 
concerning the selection procedures for grand juries are largely identical 
to those applicable to petit juries. illS Thus, the two will be considered to-
gether here. 
The constitutional maxim long has been that the jury must represent a 
fair cross section of the community. Just how fair and just how represen-
the Government's version." Closing: "They didn't answer that question to your satisfac-
tion, ladies and gentlemen. They didn't answer it at alL"); United States v. Hartley, 678 
F.2d 961, 983 (11th Cir. 1982) ("I don't recall any testimony about that."); Williams v. 
Wainwright, 673 F.2d 1182, 1184 (11th Cir. 1982) ("I think the evidence is clear, the evi-
dence is uncontradicted . . . ."). 
153. See, e.g., Baker, Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 1105-06. 
154. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 676 F.2d 1359, 1366-67 (11th Cir. 1982) (approved 
bifurcated trial with two juries, one for each of two codefendants jointly tried); Rogers v. 
McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir. 1982) (while state law may, the Constitution does 
not prohibit 17 year olds from serving on state jury). 
155. Following the introductory disclaimers of this Article, several significant grand and 
petit jury decisions are not considered in the text because they dealt with substantive rights 
or nonconstitutional procedures. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 691 F.2d 1384 
(11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Strauss, 678 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 218 (1982); Morgan v. Wain-
wright, 676 F.2d 476 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Kabbaby, 672 F.2d 857 (11th Cir. 
1982); United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Ramos, 666 
F.2d 469 (11th Cir. 1982). 
156. See generally C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 3, § 19.07, at 391-94 (standards for selec-
tion are essentially the same). 
157. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884). Of the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights that relate to criminal procedure, the grand jury clause of the fifth amendment is 
singularly not applicable to the states through fourteenth amendment due process. The 
sixth amendment right to impartial jury trial has been incorporated. Duncan v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 145, 147-58 (1968). Equal protection concerns also apply at the state and federal 
levels. 
158. See Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970). Indeed, a person may chal-
lenge a conviction because of a constitutional flaw in the grand jury process even if the 
conviction itself was rendered by a constitutionally constituted petit jury. See Cassel v. 
Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 287-90 (1950). 
159. C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 3, at 391. The discussion here narrows to consider only 
selection procedures. For a general discussion of other constitutional requirements, such as 
scope, size, unanimity, and waiver, see generally id., §§ 22.01-.08 at 430-73. 
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tative the jury must be still is the subject of many cases and controver-
sies. There are three analytical elements in a case of discrimination in 
venire selection: (1) the alleged discrimination is against a distinct class; 
(2) the class is substantially underrepresented in venires; and (3) the 
Government cannot show that the selection procedure is racially neutral 
or not susceptible to abuse as a tool of discrimination. 160 The first ele-
ment is satisfied easily when the discrimination is along classic equal pro-
tection lines such as race and gender.t61 The second element, sometimes 
referred to as the 'rule of exclusion,'161 has quantitative and temporal as-
pects, since the greater the disparity and the longer it exists, the less 
likely it results from chance or inadvertance. The typical approach to the 
statistical evaluationl63 includes three measures. The percentage of the 
relevant general population composed of the particular group allegedly 
discriminated against must be computed and compared with the percent-
age of the venire composed of members from the particular group. A sig-
nificantly large disparity between the two measures engages a rebuttable 
presumption of discrimination. The Eleventh Circuit has declined to es-
tablish any specific percentage as a benchmark for discrimination. In-
stead, following the Supreme Court lead,164 the court looks beyond the 
statistics to evaluate how long the disparity has existed, the size of the 
sample, and the demographic profile of the general population. 16& The 
third factor, the capacity for abuse of the selection process, also can affect 
the significance of the disparity. The more manipulatable the selection 
process is, the more likely the disparity is the result of manipulation. 166 
The court applied this analysis to grand jury selection procedures in 
two noteworthy survey decisions. In the first decision,167 the court held 
there was no prima facie violation of the fourteenth amendment equal 
protection or the incorporated sixth amendment fair cross section right in 
evidence of an average variance of 7.4% between the percentage of blacks 
in the general population and the percentage of blacks serving on the 
160. See generally Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 
482, 494-95 (1977). 
161. E.g., Bryant v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982); Machetti v. Linahan, 
679 F.2d 236, 238 (11th Cir. 1982). 
162. Bryant v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 1373, 1376 (11th Cir. 1982). 
163. See generally Kairys, Kadane & Lehoczky, Jury Representativeness: A Mandate 
for MUltiple Source Lists, 65 CAL. L. REV. 776 (1977). 
164. See, Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 359 (1970) (23% disparity sufficient); Whitus 
v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967) (30% disparity sufficient); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 
208 (1965) (10% insufficient). 
165. See Bryant v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 1373, 1376-77 (11th Cir. 1982). 
166. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 631-32 (1972). 
167. Bryant v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982). 
HeinOnline -- 34 Mercer L. Rev. 1263 1982-1983
1983] CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1263 
county's grand juries.1GS The disparity was not as great, as long-lived, or 
as well-documented as a statistical showing necessary to establish a con-
stitutional violation. In the second decision, the court found a prima facie 
claim of gender discrimination.1GS Women comprised 54 % of the general 
population, yet only 18% of the petit venire and 12% of the grand jury 
venire. The statistics were emphasized by state procedures that allowed 
women to opt-out of jury service, resulting in the unconstitutional imbal-
ance.170 Not all jury selection procedures that appear disparate are uncon-
stitutional, however. For example, in a third survey decision the court 
upheld a peculiar state statute that limited criminal defendants in one 
populous county to one peremptory juror challenge for each one allowed 
the prosecution even though the ratio was two-to-one everywhere else in 
the state.l1l 
The most significant new survey development in these principles was 
the court's extension of the analysis to selection procedures for grand jury 
forepersons. 172 While the Supreme Court has assumed, without decid-
ing,178 that these general principles applied to foreperson selection proce-
dures, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Perez-Hernandez17• has 
extended the traditional analysis to foreperson selection. Of course, a sin-
gle individual cannot represent a fair cross section of the community 
under the incorporated sixth amendment. The equal protection guarantee 
applies, however, to the position of foreperson and may be violated by 
improper exclusions of particular groups. The court held that the very 
same analysis already described for venire discriminations applied to dis-
crimination against potential forepersons. l7II Such challenges to foreper-
son selection procedures already have become an Eleventh Circuit 
168. ld. at 1378-79. 
169. Machetti v. Linahan, 679 F.2d 236, 241-42 (11th Cir. 1982). 
170. ld. at 238. 
171. Tarter v. James, 667 F.2d 964, 965 (11th Cir. 1982). The court adopted the district 
court's memorandum opinion that relied on nineteenth century precedents and rather un-
convincingly sought to distinguish recent decisions. The decision may be noteworthy for 
another reason. The court dismissed several state constitutional claims that apparently 
reached the merits. ld. at 970-71. This willingness to review the state constitutional issues 
may portend a dramatic future turn in equal protection jurisprudence. At least in theory, a 
state's recognition of a fundamental interest should trigger a closer judicial scrutiny than 
mere rationality. See Morgan, Fundamental State Rights: A New Basis for Strict Scru-
tiny in Federal Equal Protection Review, 17 GA. L. REv. 77 (1983). But see Tarter v. James, 
667 F.2d 964, 969 (11th Cir. 1982) (refusing federal strict scrutiny). 
172. See generally Note, Constitutional Challenges to Grand Jury Foreper-
Bon-Selection Procedures, 17 GA. L. REv. 153 (1982). 
173. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 551-52 n.4 (1979). 
174. 672 F.2d 1380 (11th Cir. 1982). 
175. ld. at 1385-88. See supra text accompanying notes 154-171. 
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fixture,178 but how far the general principles will be extended remains to 
be seen.177 
VI. RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
The right to counsel has become recognized as being central to our ad-
versarial system of justice.178 This centrality is functional, not merely as-
pirational. Judicial interpretation, rather than textual emphasis, has em-
phasized the importance of an advocate in an adversarial system. This 
judicial interpretation has composed three variations on the right to 
counsel theme. They are considered here, and are: entitlement, surren-
der, and sufficiency. 178 
The entitlement theme describes when an accused must be afforded 
counsel and other state subsidized support in defending against criminal 
charges.180 The court considered the entitlement theme in few decisions 
beyond the ordinary.181 In one extraordinary decision, the defendant was 
faced with a 'Hobson's choice,'18I and the court was faced with a knotty 
sixth amendment issue. Aptly styled United States v. Hobson/ 8s the ap-
peal was from an order of the district court that disqualified one of defen-
dant's attorneys from representing him in a drug trafficking prosecu-
tion. l &4 The appeal concerned two policies in tension. A defendant's right 
to counsel is so fundamental that only some overriding social or ethical 
176. See, e.g., Bryant v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982); Goodwin v. 
Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Holmon, 680 F.2d 1340 (11th Cir. 
1982). 
177. See United States v. Perez-Hernandez, 672 F.2d 1380, 1388 (11th Cir. 1982) (Mor-
gan, J., concurring). 
178. See Gandy v. Alabanta, 569 F.2d 1318, 1320 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[T]he right to counsel 
is a vital component in the scheme of due process and the keystone of our adversary system 
of criminal justice." 
179. See generally Baker, Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 1111-18. 
180. Id. at 1111-12. 
181. Two decisions considered the attorney-client relationship within the right to coun-
sel context. In Spivey v. Zant, 683 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B), the court held that 
neither the work-product doctrine nor personal property law entitled an attorney to refuse 
to disclose files subpoenaed by a former client seeking habeas corpus relief. In the second, 
the court reversed the denial of the Government's motion to compel an attorney to testify 
before a grand jury about the identity of the person who hired him to represent three clients 
in a drug conspiracy investigation. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 
1982) (Unit A, en banc), rev'd on rehearing, 663 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. Dec. 11, 1981) (Former 
5th). 
182. An English liveryman nanted Tobias Hobson allowed each of his customers in tum 
only the horse then nearest the door, thereby presenting them with no real alternative. 
Bartlett Fantiliar Quotations 312(b) (14th ed. 1968). 
183. 672 F.2d 825 (11th Cir. 1982). 
184. Id. at 826. 
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interest could justify any deprivation. On the other hand, the right is not 
absolute and must give way to vindicate public confidence in the integrity 
of the lEigal system. IBIi Defendant's interest in being represented by a par-
ticular attorney was outweighed by pretrial expectations that witnesses 
would portray the attorney as having acted improperly and unethically 
due to his knowledge of the smuggling operation for which the defendant 
was being tried. Public suspicion and obloquy and jury mistrust were so 
likely and so serious that defendant could not waive the disqualifica-
tion. 18G How far the trial court may go under the Constitution in disquali-
fying a defendant's chosen counsel because of the mere appearance of im-
propriety under the professional canons is unclear. Certainly, the last 
salvo has not been fired. 187 
Recently, the surrender theme of the right to counsel has been discor-
dant with the right of self-representation.188 Just as the right to counsel is 
'yin' to the right to self-representation 'yang,' the surrender of the latter 
may be harmonized with the exercise of the former. In Brown v. Wain-
wright/Bs the en banc court examined the conditions under which a de-
fendant may be considered to have surrendered the right of self-represen-
tation. The majority in Brown1so viewed the two rights as mutually 
exclusive guarantees that have different entitlement and surrender princi-
ples. The right to counsel attaches unless affirmatively waived; the right 
to self-representation does not attach until asserted. Thus, the right to 
counsel must be waived expressly, knowingly, and voluntarily. In con-
trast, the right to self-representation may be surrendered by a mere fail-
ure to assert the guarantee, which is deemed consistent with the exercise 
of the former.l9I Further, unlike the right to counsel, an accused may at 
first assert and later surrender the right to self-representation through 
subsequent inconsistent, or even equivocal, conduct. The court invoked 
185. [d. at 827. 
186. [d. at 829. 
187. See id. at 829-31 (Kravitch, J., dissenting). 
188. See generally Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (established constitutional 
right to self-representation); Rosenberg, Self-Representation and the Criminally Ac-
cused-Evolution and Scope in the Federal Courts, 13 CAL. W.L. REV. 46 (1976) (examina-
tion of scope of self-representation in light of Faretta). See also Baker, Criminal Procedure, 
supra note 2, at 1112-13. 
189. 665 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1982) (Former 5th en bane). See also United States v. Zajac, 
677 F.2d 61 (11th Cir. 1982) (waiver of conflict-free representation); United States v. Hob-
son, 672 F.2d 825, 829 (11th Cir. 1982) (defendant could not waive attorney's apparent 
impropriety). 
190. Judge Garwood wrote a separate concurring opinion. 665 F.2d at 616. Judge Hill, 
joined by Judges Rubin, Kravitch, Randall, Tate, Thomas A. Clark, and Williams, dissented 
with opinion. [d. at 612. Judge Hatchett wrote a dissent joined by Judges Rubin, Kravitch, 
Randall, Tate, and Thomas A. Clark. [d. at 614. 
191. [d. at 609-12. 
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an objective test for waiver of the right to self-representation.1911 In the 
instant case, the court concluded that, despite defendant's pretrial re-
quest to represent himself, he reasonably appeared to abandon his re-
quest by permitting court-appointed counsel to represent him and by not 
reasserting his .request until late in the trial. One cannot read the "careful 
ambiguities and silences"198 of the majority opinion without wondering if 
standby counsel and a hybrid representation have been assumed away in 
the synthetic syllogism that the right to counsel and the right to self-
representation are mutually exclusive. The standby counsel is appointed 
to assist a pro se defendant, when called upon by the defendant, and to 
assist the trial judge in presiding.194 A hybrid representation would allow 
a defendant to exercise each half of the incorporated sixth amendment by 
demanding the active assistance of an attorney while also participating as 
pro se cocounsel. 1911 The court is guilty of a familiar lawyer's er-
ror: confusing inclusive and exclusive definitions. Because there are al-
ternative, distinct constitutional policies in the right to counsel and the 
right to self-representation, the court seems to assume they are exclusive 
concepts, and the exercise of one pretermits the exercise of the other. The 
two principles are cumulative, however, and should overlap. Indeed, one 
infamous pro se defendant has explained, "Rigorously speaking, neither is 
a right if one must be renounced in order to exercise the other."l" 
The sufficiency theme, the third theme of the sixth amendment, con-
siders the allocation of the burden of persuasion, the establishment of the 
standard of adequacy, and the application of the burden and standard to 
particular situations. un During the survey period, the court issued a very 
significant decision concerning the standard of adequacy that merits close 
attention. 198 
192. Id. at 611-12. The Court declined to require a waiver hearing at trial on the consti-
tutional issue. 
193. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 279 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
194. See STANDARDS RELATING To THE FUNCTION OF THE 1'RIAL JUDGE § 6.7 (Tent. Draft 
1972). Standby counsel can raise other constitutional issues. See generally Wiggins v. Es-
telle, 681 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982) (unwanted interference by standby counsel may deny 
constitutional right of self-representation). 
195. See generally Note, Assistance of Counsel: A Right to Hybrid Representation, 57 
B.U.L. REv. 570 (1977). 
196. A. DAVIS, IF THEy COME IN THE MORNING 253 (1971). See also Comment, Self-
Representation in Criminal Trials: The Dilemma of the Pro Se Defendant, 59 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1479, 1480 (1971) (right to cocounsel status); Comment, Jury Nullification and the Pro 
Se Defense: The Impact of Dougherty v. United States, 21 U. KAN. L. REv. 47, 52, 66 
(1972). 
197. Baker, Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 1113. 
198. Claims of ineffectiveness often are founded on allegations of inadequate preparation 
or performance. E.g., Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 1982) (attorney's 
misperception of the law); Jones v. Kemp, 678 F.2d 929 (11th Cir. 1982) (defense counsel's 
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In Washington v. Strickland,199 a majority200 of the Unit B court sit-
ting en banc retooled the standard for measuring the adequacy of defense 
representation. Analytically, the court approached the issue on three 
levels. First, defense counsel must be effective, namely "counsel reasona-
bly likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance given 
the totality of the circumstances."201 Whether described as a burden to 
persuade that counsel was ineffective or as a burden to rebut a presump-
tion of competence, the 'by a preponderance' burden falls on the peti-
tioner.202 If the court finds defense counsel's performance less than effec-
tive, the court second and separately must determine whether the 
ineffectiveness created not only a possibility of prejudice but that it 
worked to the actual and substantial disadvantage of the defense.20a If a 
petitioner should meet these two burdens, then relief must be granted, 
unless, third, the government proves the ineffectiveness was harmless, 
that is, "in the context of all the evidence that it remains certain beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the outcome of the proceedings would not have 
been altered but for the ineffectiveness of counsel."204 
failure to object to instruction); Mylar v. Alabama, 671 F.2d 1299 (11th Cir. 1982) (failure to 
file brief with appeal). See Baker, Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 1114-15. This survey 
year, the effectiveness of counsel at guilty pleas was not litigated very much. See Roberts v. 
Wainwright, 666 F.2d 517 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 174 (1982). Compare 
Baker, Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 1115-16. The duty of defense attorneys to be 
familiar with the applicable law also was not litigated much. See Young v. Zant, 677 F.2d 
792 (11th Cir. 1982); cf. Baker, Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 1116. Claims of conflict 
of interest, however, continue to trouble the court, although the decided cases simply ap-
plied well-developed principles. See, e.g., United States v. Panasuk, 693 F.2d 1078 (11th Cir. 
1982); Dasher v. Stripling, 685 F.2d 385 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. McDonald, 672 
F.2d 864 (11th Cir. 1982). cf. Baker, Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 1117-18. Finally, 
the court continues to resist efforts to second guess trial strategy. See, e.g., Ford v. Strick-
land, 676 F.2d 434, 451-56 (11th Cir. 1982). 
199. 693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B en bane). 
200. The majority in favor of remanding to the district court was not the same majority 
on the substantive holdings. See id. at 1246. 
201. Id. at 1250. 
202. Id. The court expressly refused to apply a different analysis in death penalty cases, 
although the degree of punishment is deemed part of the totality of the circumstances. Id. 
at 1250-51 n.12. 
203. Cf. 693 F.2d at 1270, 1273 (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (substantially or materially affect 
the decisionmaking process of a rational sentence). The majority thus rejected a per se rule 
that a showing of counsel's ineffectiveness made out a constitutional violation. Id. at 1258-
59. In the process, the majority rejected both the panel majority's approach ('altered in a 
helpful way') and the panel dissent's approach ('affecting the outcome'). See Washington v. 
Strickland, 673 F.2d 879, 901-02 (5th Cir.) (Unit B), rev'd on rehearing 693 F.2d at 1243 
(1982). 
204. 693 F.2d at 1262 (emphasis in original). The court went on, at great length and in 
several directions, in its opinional deliberation of the actual facts and whether a remand was 
necessary. See generally id. at 1243. 
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Washington is more than old wine in a new bottle. True, the three-level 
analysis is vintage Eleventh-Fifth Circuit case law.20Ii The court changed 
the varietal, however, on the prejudice level. The law of the circuit was 
unclear on the precise degree of prejudice that a defendant must demon-
strate until the en banc court's decision.206 The court rejected a rule of 
automatic prejudice.207 The court rejected an outcome-determinative test 
applied by other courts. '08 The en banc prejudice test of actual and sub-
stantial disadvantage is something new in the law of the right to counsel 
but is something borrowed, too, from the law of habeas corpus.209 The 
statutory writ, of course, exists to remedy fundamentally unfair state 
criminal proceedings. J10 Most right to counsel issues are litigated on 
habeas corpus.2l1 Most alleged errors that go unnoticed at trial may be 
asserted within the right to counsel framework. 212 This raises a symmetry 
problem. In a recent line of decisions, the Supreme Court has developed 
the 'adequate state ground' bar to federal habeas review.218 In each case, 
trial counsel failed to make the proper objection concerning a constitu-
tional ruling at a· state trial, thus failing to preserve the error for state 
appellate review. Each decision held that a state prisoner barred by a 
procedural default from raising a constitutional claim on state direct ap-
peal could not litigate the issue in a section 2254214 proceeding without 
showing cause for and actual prejudice from the default. Having the fed-
eral court door closed on the merits of their claims, habeas petitioners 
began to sneak through the right to counsel window by alleging that the 
failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 2IIi The court 
205. See generally Comment, Standards of Attorney Competency in the Fifth Circuit, 
54 TEX. L. REv. 1081 (1976); Annat., 26 A.L.R. FED. 218 (1976). 
206. See Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794 (11th Cir. 1982); Washington v. Watkins, 
655 F.2d 1346, 1362 (5th Cir. Sept. 14, 1981) (Former 5th), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2021 
(1982). 
207. 693 F.2d at 1258-60. 
208. Id. at 1261. See United States v. Deeoster, 624 F.2d 196, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en 
bane); see also supra note 203. 
209. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
210. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). See Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs., 102 S. 
Ct. 3231, 3239-40 (1982); Rose v. Lundy, 102 S. Ct. 1198, 1216 (1982) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
211. See Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794 (11th Cir. 1982). 
212. Accord id. at 819-20 (failure to raise constitutional challenge to jury composition 
alleged as ineffective assistance). 
213. See Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1570-75 (1982); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 
152 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 
(1976). 
214. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). 
215. See Tague, The Attempt to Improve Criminol Defense Representation, 15 AM. 
CRIM. L. REv. 109, 128-30 (1977). 
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in Washington now has closed the window. By requiring a petitioner to 
show actual and substantive prejudice, the court has brought into symme-
try the prejudice prong of an incorporated sixth amendment claim with 
the cause and prejudice requirement of federal habeas relief. Indeed, the 
court borrowed the exact formulation from the habeas decisions.1l8 Sub-
stance has been synchronized with procedure. 
By way of a postscript to this section, there is one further problem in 
the Eleventh Circuit's approach to claims of ineffectiveness. In long 
standing precedent, the court has divided ineffectiveness claims at state 
trials into two categories: those related to the due process clause alone 
and those related to the sixth amendment right to counsel incorporated 
in fourteenth amendment due process.lIl7 A denial of due process results 
when the state trial is fundamentally unfair, whatever the source of un-
fairness, including, but not limited to, gross misfeasance by appointed or 
retained defense counsel.ll8 While due process stands on its own bottom, 
there is a second distinct constitutional category: the incorporated sixth 
amendment guarantee. The incorporated sixth amendment right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel always has been considered to cover "a greater 
range of counsel errors than does the fundamental fairness standard of 
the due process concept solely embodied within the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."lls This is to say that due process alone is more basic and a mini-
mum protection and counsel's ineffectiveness must be egregious to violate 
the Constitution. The incorporated sixth amendment, on the other hand, 
requires a higher standard of counsel performance and is more easily vio-
lated. The constitutional protections are distinct; the two analyses are 
different. 
For a time, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits further divided ineffective-
ness claims based on the incorporated sixth amendment on whether coun-
sel was retained or appointed.IIIiO Out of concern for federalism and based 
216. 693 F.2d at 1250, 1258 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982». 
217. Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334, 1336-37 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 422 
U.S. 1011 (1975). 
218. [d. at 1336. 
219. [d. This remains the law today. See Hardin v. Wainwright, 678 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 
1982) (Unit B); Clark v. Blackburn, 619 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1980). This is not so startling 
a revelation. The Supreme Court, in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), only over-
ruled the prior refusal to incorporate the sixth amendment in the Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 
455 (1942), 'special circumstances' due process rule. Due process was not overruled. It is not 
phenomenal that a specific incorporated guarantee can exist alongside a general due pro-
cess/fundamental fairness level of protection. Numerous due process/fundamental fairness 
holdings have survived the later incorporation of a specific criminal procedure in the bill of 
rights. See generally G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 459-502 (10th ed. 1980); W. LoCK-
HART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPBR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 480-98 (5th ed. 1980). 
220. Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334, 1336 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 
1011 (1975). 
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on a preoccupation with state action, the court applied a standard for 
retained counsel that tolerated more ineffectiveness than when counsel 
was appointed. III Following the Supreme Court's decision in Cuyler v. 
Sullivan, m the court eliminated this second analytical division between 
appointed and retained counsel of incorporated sixth amendment 
claims. us The basic and important analytical distinction between the due 
process alone and the incorporated sixth amendment remains, however. 
The due process fundamental fairness test is not the same as the incorpo-
rated sixth amendment test of rendering reasonably effective assistance. 
Despite their distinctness, the court consistently blurs the two lines of 
analysis. It relies on decisions that have been eroded by later Supreme 
Court and court of appeals developments and frequently applies a funda-
mental fairness test, ignoring the correct analysis.1I4 The court seems to 
be following headnotes and not holdings. Such unsophisticated analysis 
and inadequate research seems to coexist in the Federal Reporter along 
with clear and accurate statements of the law.lill What to make of this is 
hard to say. The principled distinction between the fourteenth amend-
ment due process alone and the incorporated sixth amendment may be 
more theoretical than real. What the court does in these appeals speaks 
louder than what the opinions say. illS The undifferentiated incorporated 
sixth amendment standard appears to be suspiciously close to the highly 
subjective and extreme 'force and mockery' standard long ago rejected in 
221. [d. at 1336-37. 
222. 446 U.S. 335 (1980). Cuyler concerned a conflict of interest claim. The Supreme 
Court held there must be a uniform standard for retained and appointed counsel in incorpo-
rated sixth amendment cases. Id. at 343-44. 
223. See Hardin v. Wainwright, 678 F.2d 589, 592 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B). 
224. See Adams v. Balkcom, 688 F.2d 734, 739 (11th Cir. 1982); Goodwin v. Balkcom, 
684 F.2d 794, 805 (11th Cir. 1982). Even the en bane court in Washington v. Strickland 
blurred the distinction by discussing prejudice in terms of fundamental fairness. 693 F.2d at 
1260. 
225. Prior to Cuyler this circuit applied different standards of effectiveness to re-
tained versus appointed counsel. Cuyler holds that there must be a uniform stan-
dard. Since Cuyler the Fifth Circuit has adopted the standard that had been ap-
plied to appointed counsel and has rejected the standard formerly applied to 
retained counsel and used here by the district court. The proper standard is thus 
whether counsel is likely to render and in fact renders reasonably effective assis-
tance, which is a more stringent standard than whether the trial was rendered 
fundamentally unfair or whether the state was put on notice of counsel's ineffec-
tiveness (citations omitted). 
Hardin v. Wainwright, 678 F.2d 589,592-93 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B) (citations omitted). See 
also Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1355 (5th Cir.) (Unit A), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 
2021 (1982). 
226. See Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235, 1244-45 n.l (5th Cir. 1978) 
(Hill, J., dissenting). 
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name and theory.1I'7 At the very least, one cannot read and research in 
this area without concluding that the Eleventh Circuit judges have a poor 
opinion of trial lawyers. Reversals under a reasonableness standard de-
scribe the court's perception of the average defense attorney. The general 
run of ineffectiveness decisions sets that average quite low. lIS 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Once again, this was a typical year for the Eleventh Circuit. liS Changes 
in constitutional criminal procedure were 'molecular' rather than 'mo-
lar'.lSo There were many more refinements of existing formulae than de-
velopments of new ones, which reflects the nature of an intermediate 
court. As the new court goes on deciding appeals, various first impressions 
of the prevailing judicial philosophy emerge-some good, some bad, but 
all interesting and important to understand. Should this survey generate 
some of that interest and help in that understanding, enough is done, and 
being done is enough.13l 
227. See Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125, 128 (5th Cir. 1974); Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 
698, 704 (5th Cir. 1965). See generally Comment, supra note 205, at llOl-08. 
228. There are few reversals, although the court often is called upon to evaluate defense 
counsel's performance. Compare Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794 (llth Cir. 1982) with 
Young v. Zant, 677 F.2d 792 (llth Cir. 1982); Compare Mylar v. Alabama, 671 F.2d 1299 
(llth Cir. 1982) with all the cases cited supra notes 176-227. 
229. Accord Baker, Criminal Procedure, supra note 2, at 1118. 
230. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
231. "Enough is abundance to the wise." Euripides: The Phoenissae, quoted in Hayes 
v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 960 n.2 (5th Cir. 1979». 
